In this Supplementary Material we present further results for TD-learning and elaborate on its failure to learn mixed Nash equilibria.
TD fails to learn a mixed Nash equilibrium
The resulting asymptotic choice behavior of TD-learning in the inspector game depends on the inverse temperature in the softmax action selection. The Nash equilibrium is never reached, though for one TD-learner playing against the algorithm one can find an inverse temperature where the behavior is at least close to Nash (Fig. S2A ). For two TD-learners ( Fig. S2B) we calculated the asymptotic behavior by demanding that the average value update equals zero, i.e. the Q-values equal the expected payoffs. Using softmax action selection and consulting the payoff table Tab.2 this yields the following system of (S2)
where we introduced the notations p s = p(shirk), p i = p(inspect), Q s = Q(shirk), Q w = Q(work), Q i = Q(inspect) and Q n = Q(don't inspect). Given the inspection costs i and some inverse temperature β, one can plug in the Q-values (Eqs. (S3)- (S6)) into Eqs. (S1) and (S2) and solve for p s and p i . It turns out that, unless i = 0.5, the Nash equilibrium p s = i and p i = 0.5 is never a solution of this system for any β. Hence, TD learning can never find the Nash equilibrium. We numerically solved the above system for different i and β and plotted p s as a function of β for different values of i (Fig. S2B) . For increasing values of β the shirk probability p s comes closer to the Nash value p s = i. But for large β's slightly imprecise estimates of the Q-values will push the shirk and inspection probabilities to either 0 or 1, as can be seen from the very right of Eqs. (S1) and (S2). In numerical simulations this is expressed by the oscillations found in the action rates and the Q-values (Fig. S2C,D) . There are long phases were the employee nearly always works and the employer inspects. Given that the employee shirks rarely, choosing to not inspect would actually yield a higher payoff for the employer, but the value of this action is still low and only updated in exploratory steps. Finally it surpasses the value of inspection and there is a phase were the employer does not inspect, which is realized after some exploratory steps by the employee who starts shirking. This leads to a drastic change in the employer's payoff and the employer's Q-values drop quickly to a low level. The employer inspects more forcing the employee to work. When the employee works again the payoff of the employer increases which he attributes to his inspection. The Q-value for inspection increases rapidly while the option to not inspect is rarely taken and its Q-value remains low, thus the cycle repeats. The period of the cycle is determined by how often exploratory steps are taken and due to the softmax action selection grows exponentially with the inverse temperature.
